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Longshoremen's Actions for Unseaworthiness
and Negligence
Peter G. Sandlund*

p

to the enactment of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Worker's Act' in 1927 the injured longshoreman's remedies
for personal injuries were sharply restricted by the common law
defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of the risk and
the fellow servant rule. In order to afford the injured longshoreman a remedy the Supreme Court in International Stevedoring
Co. v. Haverty2 decided to treat longshoremen as sailors, thus
allowing them to recover under the Jones Act, though it should
be noted that the longshoreman's action was against his employer, the master stevedore, and not against the vessel owner.
After passage of the Longshore Act the longshoreman could
no longer proceed against his employer under the Jones Act.
This was decided by the Supreme Court in Swanson v. Marra
Bros., Inc.3 In this period the concept of unseaworthiness as the
basis for recovery by a longshoreman, which first had been advanced by Mr. Justice Holmes in the Haverty case, was not followed.
The modern era in longshoremen's actions for recovery for
personal injuries may be said to begin with Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki.4 This decision revived the theory of the Haverty case
in that longshoremen were again allowed to recover for breach
of the warranty of seaworthiness. 5 This time, however, the docRIOR

* B.A., Upsala (Sweden) College; M.B.A., Gothenburg (Sweden) School of
Economics; J.D., Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College (1965). Traffic Manager, Swedish American Line Agency, Inc., Cleveland, Ohio.
1 33 U.S.C.A. Sec. 901.
2 272 U.S. 50, 47 S.Ct. 19, 71 L.Ed. 157 (1926).
3 328 U.S. 1, 66 S.Ct. 869, 90 L.Ed. 1045 (1946).
4 328 U.S. 85, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099 (1946).
5 E.g., Mollica v. Compania Sud-Americana de Vapores, 202 F. 2d 25 (2d
Cir. 1953), cert. denied 345 U.S. 965, 73 S.Ct. 952, 97 L.Ed. 1384 (1953); Pope
& Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 74 S.Ct. 202, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953); Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 348 U.S. 336, 75 S.Ct. 382, 99 LEd. 354
(1955); Pacific Far East Line, Inc. v. Williams, 234 F. 2d 378 (9th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied 352 U.S. 871, 77 S.Ct. 96, 1 L.Ed. 2d 76 (1956); Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 80 S.Ct. 926, 4 L.Ed. 2d 941 (1960).
Also see Notes, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 141-146 (1951), and 29 Tex. L. Rev. 367369 (1951) for detailed discussion of this development.
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trine was applied in holding the vessel owner liable rather than
the stevedore-employer. The case actually extends the vessel
owner's absolute warranty to include longshoremen temporarily
on board to handle cargo, on the theory that longshoremen perform a service that is traditionally seamen's work. The concurrent remedy of the longshoreman afforded by the Longshore Act
was held to be conclusive only against the stevedore-employer
and not against the vessel owner. Once the stage was set by the
Sieracki decision a steady trend towards holding the shipowner
liable without fault was established.
In order to obtain a proper perspective of the cases it is
necessary to draw a distinction between the cases governed by
common law negligence rules as extended by the Jones Act,
which in turn incorporate the negligence rules of the Federal
Employer's Liability Act, and those controlled by the general
maritime law of unseaworthiness. The latter remedy was left
intact after passage of the Jones Act,6 which simply added a
remedy for sailors without making the same exclusive against
the vessel owner. 7 These remedies form the basis for the shipowner's liability to seamen within the field where the owner is
also faced with liability to longshoremen and other maritime
workers. Other remedies available to sailors, such as the general
maritime law remedy of maintenance and cure and the statutory
remedy afforded under the Death on the High Seas Act, are beyond the scope of this article, as these remedies are not yet available to longshoremen and harbor workers."
Simultaneously, and particularly because of the decision in
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen9 which held state wrongful death
statutes inapplicable to maritime deaths, the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Worker's Act was enacted to offer protection to longshoremen and other maritime workers. The Act establishes
schedules of benefits for various types of injury and for death
and it also establishes classes of survivors entitled to death benefits.10
6 46 U.S.C.A. 688 (1920).
7 Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 44 S.Ct. 391, 63 L.Ed. 466
(1923). Also see Machnich v. Southern Steamship Co., 321 U.S. 96, 64 S.Ct.
455, 88 L.Ed. 561 (1944).

8 Weiss v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, 235 F. 2d 309, 1956 A.M.C. 1473
(2d Cir. 1956).
9 244 U.S. 205, 37 S.Ct. 524, 61 L.-d. 1086 (1917).
10 33 U.S.C.A. Secs. 908-910.
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In order to properly analyze the most recent developments
in the decisions involving a vessel owner's liability for injuries
to longshoremen, it must be borne in mind that recent awards
have been based on a merger of the various causes of action.
That the Jones Act and Longshore Act each within their respective fields of application created new remedies, goes without saying. What has added to the development reflected in these statutes is the additional impact of the courts' interpretation of the
general maritime law action for unseaworthiness. Actions under
both statutes basically sound in negligence with common law defenses eliminated by incorporation of the Federal Employer's
Liability Act into both statutes. On the other hand actions for
unseaworthiness are primarily actions for breach of warranty.
While Sieracki is the landmark case that opened the door
for longshoremen to recover for unseaworthiness, it by no means
settled all the questions that arise in applying the concept to
shore based maritime workers. Just as there is a long line of
cases starting with O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock
Co.," under which the Jones Act can literally be said to have
gone ashore with the sailor, there is a parallel development in
the application of the concept of unseaworthiness as applied to

longshoremen. Strika v. Holland American Line12 extended the
vessel owner's liability for an unseaworthy condition to a longshoreman who was injured on the dock due to defective ship's
gear (use of a defective bridle in lifting ship's pontoons from the
dock). This development is strikingly illustrated by Hagans v.
Ellerman & Bucknall Steamship Co. 13 wherein unseaworthiness

of the vessel due to improper stowage was held to have contributed to plaintiff's injury when he slipped on sand that had spilled
from bags that had been discharged from the vessel and had been
removed to the pier over 100 feet distant from the vessel. This
question was settled by the Supreme Court in Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp.1 4 wherein plaintiff was allowed to recover against the vessel owner for injuries suffered when he
318 U.S. 36, 63 S.Ct. 488, 87 L.Ed. 596 (1943).
185 F. 2d 555 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied 341 U.S. 904, 71 S.Ct. 614, 95
L.Ed. 1343 (1950).
'is 196 F. Supp. 593 (D.C., E.D. Pa. 1961), reversed and remanded on other
grounds, 318 F. 2d 563 (3d Cir. 1963).
14 373 U.S. 206, 83 S.Ct. 1185, 10 L.Ed. 2d 297 (1963).
"

12
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slipped on beans scattered on the dock from broken bags recently unloaded from the vessel.
The development and effect of the cases starting with Sieracki and ending with Gutierrez points out a situation whereby
shore workers first figuratively climbed on board and were treated as seamen entitled to recover from the owner for unseaworthiness. Hence the longshoremen returned ashore and brought the
protection afforded by the action of breach of the warranty of
seaworthiness with them. The ultimate effect of these cases is to
neutralize the effect of the decision in Swanson v. Marra Bros.,
Inc. 15 The Swanson case is still the law in that a longshoreman
still cannot proceed against his employer under the Jones Act.
Also, technically the longshoreman's remedy towards his employer is restricted to compensation under the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Worker's Act. Ultimately the master stevedore's
liability extends further, as in those cases where the ship owner
is found liable for an unseaworthy condition without fault, he
may recover an indemnity from the stevedore for breach of the
latter's warranty to perform his service in a workmanlike manner. This issue was settled by Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. PanAtlantic Steamship Corp.,16 and the theory of such indemnification was further clarified in Weyerhauser Steamship Co. v.
Nacirema Operating Co.1 wherein the court pointed out that the
vessel owner's liability to longshoremen is imposed without fault
whereas the stevedore is only liable when he is negligent. Therefore a judgment against the vessel owner in a longshoreman's
suit will not preclude him from recovering indemnification from
a negligent stevedore causing the injury.
The issue as to the ship owner's liability for an unseaworthy
condition is frequently obscured by cases involving injuries
caused by negligent acts of the stevedoring contractor. Early
cases held that the stevedore was liable for any unseaworthy
condition that arose on the part of the vessel over which he took
constructive possession, provided the condition arose after he had
taken possession. However, after the Sieracki decision the own15 Supra n. 3.
16 350 U.S. 124, 76 S.Ct. 232, 100 L.Ed. 133 (1956). See also Crumady v.
Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423, 79 S.Ct. 445, 3 L.Ed. 2d 413 (1959);
and Italia Societa per Azioni v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315, 84
S.Ct. 748, 11 L.Ed. 2d 732 (1964).
17 355 U.S. 563, 78 S.Ct. 438, 2 L.Ed. 2d 491 (1958).
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er was under a liability to keep a seaworthy ship regardless of
fault and it became highly doubtful that the owner could escape
liability. In 1950 the Third Circuit, in Cookinghm v. United
States,'8 followed the earlier cases, but subsequently the Supreme Court decided Alaska Steamship Co. v. Petterson19 which
established the owner's liability without fault for the portion of
the vessel constructively surrendered to the stevedore. This decision and subsequent cases 20 base the vessel owner's liability on
his absolute duty to furnish a seaworthy vessel. His actual or
constructive notice of such unseaworthy condition is not neces21
sary.
The perplexing intermingling of unseaworthiness and active
negligence is well illustrated in Di Salvo v. Cunard Steamship
Co. 22 wherein the court found operational unseaworthiness by
improper use of proper gear. Another area in which the interrelationship between the vessel owner and the stevedore may
easily be confused arises in those situations where the operator
of the vessel is also the stevedore. In denying the owner the
benefit of the limitations of the Longshore Act the Supreme
Court looked to the substance of the relationship rather than
23
the form.
Ferrantev. Swedish American Lines2 4 and Thompson v. Calmar Steamship Corp.25 represent the most recent development in
the interrelated field of operating negligence by a stevedore and
the ship owner's absolute liability to furnish a seaworthy vessel.
Ferranteinvolved an injury caused by negligent use of a fit rope
furnished by the vessel to the stevedore for discharge of ply's 184 F. 2d 213 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied 340 U.S. 935, 71 S.Ct. 495, 95
L.Ed. 675 (1951).
19 205 F. 2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), affd. 347 U.S. 396, 74 S.Ct. 601, 98 L.Ed.
798 (1953).
20 E.g., Tarkington v. United States Lines Co., 222 F. 2d 358 (2d Cir. 1955);
Gindville v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 224 F. 2d 746 (3d Cir. 1955);
Pacific Far East Line, Inc. v. Williams, 234 F. 2d 378 (9th Cir. 1956); Considine v. Black Diamond Steamship Corp., 163 F. Supp. 107 (D.C. Mass.
1958).
21 Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 80 S.Ct. 926, 4 L.Ed. 2d 941
(1960).
22 171 F. Supp. 813 (D.C., S.D.N.Y. 1959).
23 373 U.S. 410, 83 S.Ct. 1349, 10 L.Ed. 2d 448 (1963).
24 331 F. 2d 571 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed 379 U.S. 801, 85 S.Ct. 10
(1964).
25 331 F. 2d 657 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 913, 85 S.Ct. 259 (1964).
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wood. Thompson on the other hand involved an accident causing
personal injuries by negligent use of the vessel's gear to hump
26
railroad cars on the dock. In Knox v. United States Lines Co.
an attempt had been made to draw a distinction between an
existing condition causing injury and a negligent act causing instantaneous injury, but this theory was abandoned in Ferrante
and Thompson to the extent that they in fact overrule Knox.
Rather than adopting the distinction based on the argument that
unseaworthiness must be a condition in that it must have duration and must exist for a time before the accident, the Court
followed the sweeping theories spelled out in Alaska Steamship
Co. v. Petterson27 and Mitchell v. Trawler Racer Inc. 28

The

soundness of these decisions must rest on policy grounds to justify this broad extension of the application of the doctrine of seaworthiness. The decisions follow the reasoning of a recently
29
preceding line of cases decided in the Second Circuit.
The soundness of the Ferrante and Thompson decisions has
already been questioned,3 0 and before the merger of unseaworthiness and negligence will be accepted doctrine this issue will no
doubt be raised again in the Supreme Court. In Morales v. City
of Galveston"' the high court found a vessel seaworthy when
plaintiff inhaled noxious fumes from grain just released into the
vessel's hold. Here the Court reasoned that the cause of the
injury was not any defect in the ship, but rather the isolated
and completely unforeseeable introduction of a noxious agent
from without. The case readopts the transitory hazard doctrine
294 F. 2d 354 (3d Cir. 1961), on remand 201 F. Supp. 131 (E.D. Pa. 1962),
affd. 320 F. 2d 247 (3d Cir. 1963).
27 Supra n. 19.
28 Supra n. 21.
29 Grillea v. United States, 232 F. 2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956); Paddu v. Royal
Netherlands Steamship Co., 303 F. 2d 752 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied 371
U.S. 840, 83 S.Ct. 67, 9 LEd. 2d 75 (1962); Spinelli v. Isthmian Steamship
Co., 326 F. 2d 870 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied 377 U.S. 935, 84 S.Ct. 1333, 12
L.Ed. 2d 298 (1964).
However, note Blier v. United States Lines Co., 286 F. 2d 920 (2d Cir.
1961), cert. denied 368 U.S. 836, 82 S.Ct. 32, 7 L.Ed. 2d 37 (1961); and Pinto
v. States Marine Corp., 296 F. 2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied 369 U.S. 843,
82 S.Ct. 874, 7 L.Ed. 2d 874 (1961), wherein the Second Circuit drew a distinction between negligence and unseaworthiness.
30 Guarracino v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 333 F. 2d 646, 648 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 946, 85 S.Ct. 439 (1964).
31 370 U.S. 165, 82 S.Ct. 1266, 8 L.Ed. 2d 412 (1961).
26
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from Cookingham v. United States32 and Poignant v. United
States. s3 The Morales decision has since been subjected to at34
tempts at harmonizing.
In attempting to synthesize the issues involving unseaworthiness and negligence and their interrelation, one is left with the
definite impression that the question will again have to be presented to the courts for determination, as present decisions are
both conflicting and confusing. Ultimately it is to be hoped that
a distinction will be drawn between the two classes of cases and
that the present trend of merging the two remedies into one will
be reversed. Seaworthiness within the field of the general maritime law, and negligence as applied under the Jones Act and the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Act afford ample remedies
to the parties covered by the respective acts and by the strict
liability imposed upon the owner of an unseaworthy vessel. But
by allowing recovery under theories that mix the two remedies
the courts are creating an additional remedy not granted by
Congress when it adopted the Jones Act and the Longshore Act.
If future decisions follow the Ferrante and Thompson cases,
longshoremen will be in a position to expand their remedy
against their employer by indirection, thus obtaining what they
are not allowed by direct suit against the stevedore employer.
The fact that the Morales decision was not overruled or directly
affected by the Ferrante and Thompson decisions may hold the
answer to the solution of this issue.
32

Supra n. 18.

33 225 F. 2d 595 (2d Cir. 1955).
34 See Castro v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 325 F. 2d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1963).
Also Gainor v. Longview Victory, 226 F. Supp. 912, 916 (D.C. Va. 1963), affd.
338 F. 2d 959 (4th Cir. 1964).
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